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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
WENDY MARIE CHRISTENSEN
RAWLINGS,

]
•

Plaintiff/CrossAppellant,

BRIEF OF CROSS-RESPONDENT

]

vs.
MARK DOUGLAS WEINER,
>

Case No. 860274-CA

Defendant/CrossRespondent .
JURISDICTION OF COURT
On November 18, 1986, Defendant and Cross-Respondent
Mark Douglas Weiner (hereinafter "Mark Weiner") appealed an
Order on Order to Show Cause signed and entered October 21,
1986 by the First Judicial District Court in and for Box Elder
County, Utah (hereinafter "First District Court"), the
Honorable Omer J. Call presiding.

Mark WeinerTs appeal was

dismissed by order of this court dated June 9, 1987.

On

November, 26, 1986, Plaintiff and Cross-Appellant Wendy Marie
Christensen Rawlings (hereinafter "Wendy Rawlings") crossappealed.
This Court has jurisdiction over the appeal in this
matter by virtue of the Constitution of Utah, Article VIII,
Section 1 et seq., Section 78-2a-l et seq. Utah Code Ann.
(1953 as amended), and Rule 3 R.Utah Ct.App.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Wendy Rawlings cross-appealed Judge Call's October 21,
1986 Order on Order to Show Cause on the grounds that the

First District Court lacked jurisdiction to hear and enter the
order.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Did the trial court have jurisdiction?

If so, did the

trial court abuse its discretion in retaining and exercising
its continuing jurisdiction to modify the parties' divorce
decree?
APPLICABLE STATUTES
Section 30-3-5(1) Utah Code Ann. (1953):
When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court
may include in it such orders in relation to the
children, property and parties, and the
maintenance and health care of the parties and
children, as may be equitable.
***

The court shall have continuing jurisdiction to
make such subsequent changes or new orders with
respect to the support and maintenance of the
parties, the custody of the children and their
support, maintenance, and health and dental
care, or the distribution of the property as
shall be reasonable and necessary. Visitation
rights of parents, grandparents, and other
relatives shall take into consideration the
welfare of the child.
Applicable sections from the Utah Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction Act:
Section 78-45c-l.
(1)

Purposes - Construction.

The general purposes of this act are to:

(a) avoid jurisdiction competition and
conflict with courts of other states in matters
of child custody which have in the past resulted
in the shifting of children from state to state
with harmful effects on their well-being;
(b) promote cooperation with the courts of
other states to the end that a custody decree is
rendered in that state which can best decide the
case in the interest of the child;
-2-

(c) assure that litigation concerning the
custody of a child take place ordinarily in the
state with which the child and his family have
the closest connection and where significant
evidence concerning his care, protection,
training, and personal relationships is most
readily available, and that courts of this state
decline the exercise of jurisdiction when the
child and his family have a closer connection
with another state;
(d) discourage continuing controversies
over child custody in the interest of greater
stability of home environment and of secure
family relationships for the child;
(e) deter abductions and other unilateral
removals of children undertaken to obtain
custody awards;
(f) avoid relitigation of custody
decisions of other states in this state insofar
as feasible;
(g) facilitate the enforcement of custody
decrees of other states;
(h) promote and expand the exchange of
information and other forms of mutual assistance
between the courts of this state and those of
other states concerned with the same child; and
(i) to make uniform the law of those
states which enact it.
(2) This title shall be construed to promote
the general purposes stated in this section.
Section 78-45c-3. Bases of jurisdiction in this state.
(1) A court of this state which is competent to
decide child custody matters has jurisdiction to
make a child custody determination by initial or
modification decree if the conditions as set
forth in any of the following paragraphs are
met:
(a) This state (i) is the home state
of the child at the time of commencement of
the proceeding, or (i) had been the child's
home state within six months before
commencement of the proceeding and the
child is absent from this state because of
his removal or retention by a person
claiming his custody or for other reasons,
and a parent or person acting as parent
continues to live in this state;
(b) It is in the best interest of the
child that a court of this state assume
-3-

jurisdiction because (i) the child and his
parents, or the child and at least one
contestant, have a significant connection
with this state, and (ii) there is
available in this state substantial
evidence concerning the child's present or
future care, protection, training, and
personal relationships;
(c) The child is physically present
in this state and (i) the child has been
abandoned or (ii) it is necessary in an
emergency to protect the child because he
has been subjected to or threatened with
mistreatment or abuse or is otherwise
neglected or dependent; or
(d) (i) It appears that no other
state would have jurisdiction under
prerequisites substantially in accordance
with Paragraphs (a), (b), or (c), or
another state has declined to exercise
jurisdiction on the ground that this state
is the more appropriate forum to determine
the custody of the child, and (ii) it is in
the best interest of the child that this
court assume jurisdiction.
(2) Except under Paragraphs (c) and (d) of
Subsection (1), physical presence in this state
of the child, or of the child and one of the
contestants, is not alone sufficient to confer
jurisdiction on a court of this state to make a
child custody determination.
(3) Physical presence of the child, while
desirable, is not a prerequisite for
jurisdiction to determine his custody.
Section 78-45c-7. Declining jurisdiction on finding of
inconvenient forum--Factors in determination-Communication with other court--Awarding Costs.
(1) A court which has jurisdiction under this
act to make an initial or modification decree
may decline to exercise its jurisdiction any
time before making a decree if it finds that it
is an inconvenient forum to make a custody
determination under the circumstances of the
case and that a court of another state is a more
appropriate forum.
(2) A finding of inconvenient forum may be made
upon the court's own motion or upon motion of a
-4-

party or a guardian ad litem or other
representative of the child.
(3) In determining if it is an inconvenient
forum, the court shall consider if it is in the
interest of the child that another state assume
jurisdiction. For this purpose it may take into
account the following factors, among others:
(a) if another state is or recently was
the child's home state;
(b) if another state has a closer
connection with the child and his family or with
the child and one or more of the contestants;
(c) if substantial evidence concerning the
child's present or future care, protection,
training, and personal relationships is more
readily available in another state;
(d) if the parties have agreed on another
forum which is no less appropriate; and
(e) if the exercise of jurisdiction by a
court of this state would contravene any of the
purposes stated in Section 78-45c-l.
(4) Before determining whether to decline or
retain jurisdiction the court may communicate
with a court of another state and exchange
information pertinent to the assumption of
jurisdiction by either court with a view to
assuring that jurisdiction will be exercised by
the more appropriate court and that a forum will
be available to the parties.
***

(9) Any communication received from another
state informing this state of a finding of
inconvenient forum because a court of this state
is the more appropriate forum shall be filed in
the custody registry of the appropriate court.
Upon assuming jurisdiction the court of this
state shall inform the original court of this
fact.
Section 78-45c-8. Misconduct of petitioner as basis
for refusing jurisdiction—Notice to another
jurisdiction—Ordering petitioner to appear in other
court or to return child--Awarding costs.
(1) If the petitioner for an initial decree has
wrongfully taken the child from another state or
has engaged in similar reprehensible conduct the
court may decline to exercise jurisdiction for
purposes of adjudication of custody if this is
just and proper under the circumstances.
-5-

(2) Unless required in the interest of the
child, the court shall not exercise its
jurisdiction to modify a custody decree of
another state if the petitioner, without consent
of the person entitled to custody has improperly
removed the child from the physical custody of
the person entitled to custody or has improperly
retained the child after a visit or other
temporary relinquishment of physical custody.
If the petitioner has violated any other
provision of a custody decree of another state
the court may decline to exercise its
jurisdiction if this is just and proper under
the circumstances.
***

(4) Where the court refuses to assume
jurisdiction to modify the custody decree of
another state pursuant to Subsection (2) or
pursuant to Section 78-45c-14, the court shall
notify the person who has legal custody under
the decree of the other state and the
prosecuting attorney of the appropriate
jurisdiction in the other state and may order
the petitioner to return the child to the person
who has legal custody. If it appears that the
order will be ineffective and the legal
custodian is ready to receive the child within a
period of a few days, the court may place the
child in a foster care home for such period,
pending return of the child to the legal
custodian. At the same time, the court shall
advise the petitioner that any petition for
modification of custody must be directed to the
appropriate court of the other state which has
continuing jurisdiction, or, in the event that
that court declines jurisdiction, to a court in
a state which has jurisdiction pursuant to
Section 78-45c-3.
***

Section 78-45c-13. Recognition and enforcement of
foreign decrees.
The courts of this state shall recognize and
enforce an initial or modification decree of a
court of another state which had assumed
jurisdiction under statutory provisions
substantially in accordance with this act or
which was made under factual circumstances
meeting the jurisdictional standards of the act,
so long as this decree has not been modified in
-6-

accordance with jurisdictional standards
substantially similar to those of this act.
Section 78-45c-14. Modification of foreign decree—
Prerequisites—Factors considered.
(1) If a court of another state has made a
custody decree, a court of this state shall not
modify that decree unless (a) it appears to the
court of this state that the court which
rendered the decree does not now have
jurisdiction under jurisdictional prerequisites
substantially in accordance with this act or has
declined to assume jurisdiction to modify the
decree and (b) the court of this state has
jurisdiction.
(2) If a court of this state is authorized
under Subsection (1) and Section 78-45c-8 to
modify a custody decree of another state it
shall give due consideration to the transcript
of the record and other documents of all
previous proceedings submitted to it in
accordance with Section 78-45c-22.
28 U.S.C.S. Section 1738A:
(1) Full faith and credit given to child
custody determinations
(a) The appropriate authorities of every State
shall enforce according to its terms, and shall
not modify except as provided in subsection (f)
of this section, any child custody determination
made consistently with the provisions of this
section by a court of another State.
***

(c) A child custody determination made by a
court of a State is consistent with the
provisions of this section only i f —
(1) such court has jurisdiction under
the law of such State; and
(2) one of the following conditions
is met:
(A) such State (i) is the home State
of the child on the date of the
commencement of the proceeding, or (i)
had been the child's home State within
six months before the date of the
commencement of the proceeding and the
child is absent from such State
because of his removal or retention by
-7-

a contestant or for other reasons, and
a contestant continues to live in such
State;
(B)(i) it appears that no other
State would have jurisdiction
under subparagraph (A), and (ii)
it is in the best interest of the
child that a court of such State
assume jurisdiction because (I)
the child and his parents, or the
child and at least one
contestant, have a significant
connection with such State other
than mere physical presence in
such State, and (II) there is
available in such State
substantial evidence concerning
the child's present or future
care, protection, training, and
personal relationships;
(C) the child is physically
present in such State and (i) the
child has been abandoned, or (ii)
it is necessary in an emergency
to protect the child because he
has been subjected to or
threatened with mistreatment or
abuse;
(D) (i) it appears that no other
State would have jurisdiction
under subparagraph (A), (B), (C),
or (E), or another State has
declined to exercise jurisdiction
on the ground that the State
whose jurisdiction is in issue is
the more appropriate forum to
determine the custody of the
child, and (ii) it is in the best
interest of the child that such
court assume jurisdiction; or
(E) the court has continuing
jurisdiction pursuant to
subsection (d) of this section.
(d) The jurisdiction of a court of a State
which has made a child custody determination
consistently with the provisions of this section
continues as long as the requirement of
subsection (c)(1) of this section continues to
be met and such State remains the residence of
the child or of any contestant.
(e) Before a child custody determination is
made, reasonable notice and opportunity to be
-8-

heard shall be given to the contestants, any
parent whose parental rights have not been
previously terminated and any person who has
physical custody of a child.
(f) A court of a State may modify a
determination of the custody of the same child
made by a court of another State, i f —
(1) it has jurisdiction to make such a
child custody determination; and
(2) the court of the other State no longer
has jurisdiction, or it has declined to
exercise such jurisdiction to modify such
determination.
(g) A court of a State shall not exercise
jurisdiction in any proceeding for a custody
determination commenced during the pendency of a
proceeding in a court of another State where
such court of that other State is exercising
jurisdiction consistently with the provisions of
this Section to make a custody determination.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

Nature of the Case.

The Order on Order to Show Cause from which Wendy
Rawlings cross-appealed made numerous rulings:

held Wendy

Rawlings in contempt for her failure to obey a previous order
of the Court requiring her to use the Weiner name for the
children; required counseling for the parties and the
children; set out guidelines for visitation and phone calls
with the children; awarded Mark Weiner joint custody of his
children with primary physical custody to Wendy Rawlings and
carefully defined visitation to Mark Weiner; as well as making
orders on several other matters.

The order contained twenty

paragraphs, nearly all of which ruled on a different aspect of
the case.
In her statement on the nature of the proceedings,
Wendy Rawlings incorrectly characterized the Order on Order to
-9-

Show Cause as only changing custody of the parties' children
to Mark Weiner.

The Order on Order to Show Cause only awards

joint custody while leaving the primary residence of the
children with Wendy Rawlings.

As stated above, the Order on

Order to Show Cause also covered several matters in addition
to the joint custody award.
2.

Course of Proceedings, and Disposition at Trial

Court.
Wendy Rawlings1 statements on these points are accurate
as far as they go.

However, a long history of proceedings in

the First District Court predates the Order on Order to Show
Cause from which Wendy Rawlings takes her cross-appeal.

The

history will be as briefly stated as possible in the Statement
of Facts below.
3.

Statement of Facts.

A rendition by Mark Weiner of the facts in this case in
addition to the facts stated by Wendy Rawlings is necessary
for two reasons:

(1) the facts stated in Wendy Rawlings'

brief are not tied to the record as required by Rule 24(e)
R.Utah Ct.App.; and (2) Wendy Rawlings' Statements of Facts
did not include several facts essential to the deciding of
this appeal.

A response on several facts stated by Wendy

Rawlings is also necessary as those facts are not properly
before this Court.

The response is set out in Argument III at

page 39 herein.
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Concurrent with the filing of this brief, Mark Weiner
filed a motion to supplement the record in this case.
Assuming this Court will allow Mark Weiner?s motion, but not
yet having a numbered record to refer to, many of the facts
stated herein are referenced to original pleadings in the
trial court file by title of the pleading and date filed.

1.

Mark Weiner and Wendy Rawlings were married August

16, 1974, in Manti, Utah.
issue of their marriage:

The parties had five children as
Mark Christian Weiner; America

Jerusha Weiner; Samuel Nathan Weiner; Esther Noel Weiner; and
Joseph Todd Weiner.

(Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions

of Law, paragraphs 3 and 4, filed 9/27/82.)
2.

On November 17, 1981, Wendy Rawlings (then Wendy

Weiner) filed in the First District Court for a divorce from
her husband, Mark Weiner.

At the time of filing, the

children's ages ranged from 6 years old to 1 month old.
(Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, paragraphs 1
and 4, filed 9/27/82.)
3.

After a trial on May 6, 1982, before Judge Call,

the parties were divorced on May 18, 1982.

An original decree

was entered at that time but later amended on September 27,
1987.

The Amended Decree provided that Wendy Rawlings be

awarded custody of the parties' children.

Mark Weiner was

awarded carefully enunciated visitation rights with his
-11-

children.

(Amended Decree of Divorce, paragraph 2, filed

9/27/82.)
4.

On November 3, 1982, Mark Weiner filed an Affidavit

and Motion for Order to Show Cause alleging Wendy Rawlings'
disregarding of the visitation provisions of the Amended
Decree of Divorce.

The Court signed an Order to Show Cause.

(Affidavit, filed 11/3/82; Motion for Order to Show Cause,
filed 11/3/82; and Order to Show Cause filed 11/10/82.)
5.

On November 8, 1982, Wendy Rawlings filed an Order

to Show Cause, Motion for More Definite Statement, and
Petition for Modification of Decree (all filed 11/8/82).
6.

Mark Weiner's Order to Show Cause was heard

November 8, 1982. Judge Call admonished the parties "to live
in accordance with the visitation order as presently set forth
by the Court," rejected Wendy Rawlings1 Motion for More
Definite Statement, and ordered a trial date be set to hear
Wendy Rawlings1 Order to Show Cause and Petition for
Modification requests. No hearing was ever held on Wendy
Rawlings1 Order to Show Cause and Petition for Modification.
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order on Order to
Show Cause filed 11/17/82.)
7.

On December 13, 1982 a hearing was held in front of

Judge Call for the purpose of interpreting the Amended Decree
of Divorce as to Christmas visitation.

Judge Call hand-wrote

on the Order entered December 22, 1982 that "any Law
Enforcement officer is hereby requested and authorized to
-12-

assist if needed in carrying out this Order.
Omer J. Call, Dist. Judge."
8.

Dec. 22, 1982

(Order, filed 12/22/82.)

On May 9, 1983 a hearing was held on an Order to

Show Cause filed by Mark Weiner.

Judge Call had before him

family studies by Dr. T. Brent Price (hired by Mark Weiner)
and Dr. Kim Openshaw (hired by Wendy Rawlings).

In the Order

on Order to Show Cause, Judge Call again ruled:

"That the

visitation schedule as set forth in the Amended Decree of
Divorce entered on the 25th day of September, 1982, be
strictly adhered to by the parties."

(Order on Order to Show

Cause, filed 5/16/83.)
9.

As part of the 12/22/82 order, Mark Weiner was

ordered to submit to a home study to be arranged by Wendy
Rawlings.
10.

(Order, paragraph 3, filed 12/22/82.)
On December 23, 1982, Wendy Rawlings married Mark

Rawlings.
11.

On October 18, 1983, a hearing was held before

Judge Call on Mark Weiner?s request that there be counseling
for the parties1 children.

Dr. T. Brent Price testified.

Judge Call found the following:
1. That hostility and disappointment which
(Wendy Rawlings) feels toward Defendant is being
allowed to upset the children.
2. That Plaintiff has concluded that she
and her present husband provide a new set of
parents for the minor children of the parties,
with the ultimate authority in Plaintiff and in
Plaintiff's present husband, which conclusion is
not in the best interests of the children.
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3. That it is in the best interests of the
children to require Plaintiff and her present
husband and the children to obtain family
therapy.
4. That based upon the recommendations of
Dr. T. Brent Price and Drs. Fairbank and
Openshaw in a letter, in testimony by Dr. Price
and in a letter presented to the Court, the
Court recommends that therapy of Plaintiff,
Plaintiff's present husband, and the minor
children of the parties be had through either
Dr. Meredith Alden, Dr. Curtis Canning, or Dr.
William Dobson.
***

(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order on Order to
Show Cause, filed 2/16/84.)
12.

At the proceedings on October 18, 1983, Judge Call

made the following comments from the bench:
***

Now, it's true you were awarded custody,
Mrs. Rawlings. But you won't find anything in
my decree, in any order I've issued, in anything
else that's come out of this court that
displaces Mark Weiner as the father of these
children. Now, the fact that you married Mark
Rawlings didn't alter in the slightest the
paternity nor the paternal rights.
Now, I can see that you, either because of
your training or something else, have decided
that, in the best interest of these children,
that they immediately learn that there is a new
father figure in your home. You don't find
anything in the decree or any order of this
court to that effect. I'm not prepared to say
that. And I have never said it. None of the
psychologists have said it. They recognize that
the new husband may well have a role. I may
even be required to impose some discipline as
the breadwinner or the provider to some extent.
But in this case none of that deprives the
father, the natural father, of his role as
father. But I find from everything that has
gone on here that you have concluded that you
and Mark Rawlings are now the parents. You and
Mark Rawlings have the responsibility to dictate
-14-

what is best for the children. You and Mark
Rawlings have the right to say what is best for
the children.
I have to dispose your mind of that. That
isn't the case. He has some visitation
privileges and custodial rights while they are
with him. And in the absence of harm or
upsetting circumstances, it's not your problem
that the children sleep in a sleeping bag. It's
not your problem that all of the children end up
in the same room in one night. I'd be surprised
if they didn't. If you're able to carry on an
activity in one room and put the children in
another room, you're lucky. All the kids want
to be where the action is. When they go to bed
I'm not alarmed at that. Apparently the
psychologist isn't alarmed at that. Don't
decide that you, then, have got to arrange the
physical set up over at the Weiner home.
***

(Partial Transcript of Proceedings held 10/18/83, filed
11/22/83.)
13.

On May 29, 1984, Judge Call entered Findings of

Fact and Conclusions of Law and an Order on Order to Show
Cause on a hearing held before him on April 6, 1984 on an
Order to Show Cause initiated by Mark Weiner.

The Court's

edict was the same:
1. That the visitation of the children by
[Mark Weiner] be as specifically stated in the
Amended Divorce Decree. There are to be no
changes in the visitation as specifically set
forth in the Amended Divorce Decree except by
mutual agreement of the parties. In the case
where the children are sick, the keeping of the
children from visitation by [Wendy Rawlings]
must be supported by a doctor's statement that
the child is in fact unable to go to visitation.
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order on Order to
Show Cause, filed 5/29/84.)

-15-

14.

On June 22, 1984, a letter from Wendy Rawlings and

her husband, Mr. Mark Rawlings, was filed with the Court.

The

letter stated:
Dear Mr. Weiner:
Mark has accepted employment in the Des Moines
area, so we have moved. Our forwarding address
is: Mark Rawlings, P. 0. Box 477, Brigham City,
Utah 84302.
We will contact you to make suitable visitation
modifications.
With Best Wishes,
Mark and Wendy Rawlings
(Letter, filed 6/22/84.)
15.

During the summer of 1984, multiple Motions for

Orders to Show Cause were filed by Mark Weiner and multiple
Orders to Show Cause were signed by the Court attempting to
find the whereabouts of Wendy Rawlings and the children.

In

an August 8, 1984 Order, Judge Call extended indefinitely Mark
Weiner?s summer visitation with the children pending Wendy
Rawlings providing Mark Weiner a residential address at which
Wendy Rawlings and the children resided.

(Motion for Order to

Show Cause, Affidavit, and Order to Show Cause, filed 7/16/84;
Motion for Order to Show Cause, Order to Show Cause and
Temporary Order, and Order for Service, filed 7/26/84; Order,
filed 8/8/84.)
16.

On October 23, 1984, a hearing was held before

Judge Call on an Order to Show Cause initiated by Mark Weiner,
and an Order to Show Cause filed by Wendy Rawlings.
-16-

Besides

the parties, Sheila Miller of Bear River Mental Health and Dr.
Kim Openshaw, both child counselors, testified.

On December

17, 1984, the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and
Order on Order to Show Cause were entered on the October 23,
1984 hearing.

The trial court found that where Wendy Rawlings

had moved herself and the children some 800 miles, the move
constituted a substantial change in circumstances upon which
the Court modified the visitation.

The Court provided for

visitation by the maternal grandparents when the children were
in Brigham City, where their grandparents live.

Further, the

Court found that "it is not in the best interests of the
children nor of their father, Mr. Weiner, that the children be
called Rawlings.
used."

Accordingly, only the Weiner name should be

(Clerk's Minute Entry, filed 10/23/84; Findings of

Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order to order to Show Cause,
filed 12/17/84. )
17.

On September 17, 1985, upon motion and affidavit

of Mark Weiner (Mark Weiner was representing himself at this
point), Judge Call signed an order providing that Wendy
Rawlings provide Mark Weiner "with the address of the new
domicile of the minor children of the parties and with the new
phone number at said domicile" and that child support be held
by the Clerk of the Court until the new address and phone
number were provided.

On an October 10, 1985 letter to the

Clerk from Stephen W. Jewell, Wendy Rawlings' counsel, Judge
Call noted:

"Sharon you can release the current checks to
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Wendy's parents.

Oct. 16th-85.

O.J.C."

(Order, filed

9/17/85; Letter, filed 10/15/85.)
18.

On October 23, 1985, Mark Weiner filed his Motion

for Order to Show Cause and Temporary Order and Affidavit in
support thereof.

(Motion for Order to Show Cause and

Affidavit, filed 10/23/85.)
19.

On or about November 5, 1985, Wendy Rawlings filed

a Motion to Transfer Jurisdiction From Utah to Washington
State.

(Motion of Petitioner for Transfer of Jurisdiction

from Utah to Washington, filed 11/18/85.)

Apparently relying

on the motion filed in Washington, Wendy Rawlings filed a
memorandum with the First Judicial District Court in Box Elder
County, Utah.
20.

(Record, page 1.)

On December 18, 1985, Wendy Rawlings filed a

Motion to Disqualify Judge Call, with a certificate by
counsel, Stephen Jewell, and Affidavit of Wendy Rawlings in
support of the motion.
21.

(Record, pages 12-18.)

On December 23, 1985, Judge Call filed a Statement

and Order and certified the matters of disqualification and
jurisdictional to Judge VeNoy Christoffersen of the First
Judicial Court for Utah for determination.
28.

(Record, pages 26-

There is a copy of the Statement and Order in the

Addendum.)
22.

Responding to the disqualification claim, Judge

Call summarized the case:
(a) That numerous documents appearing to
be letters or statements of both parties,
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requests and reports have been presented to the
Judge's secretary and the clerks of court, all
of which the Judge has declined to receive or
review, but has ordered the same returned or
held in a separate file by the secretary;
(b) The Judge has further refused to
accept phone calls or otherwise discuss or meet
with the defendant;
(c) That the Judge has advised the
secretary and court clerks that the defendant
would have to comply with applicable procedures,
including notice to the opposing party in order
to bring his requests before the court.
After numerous hearings dating from the
year 1981, the court has entered a decree,
amended decree, and several orders on orders to
show cause, the effect of which was to fix
rights of visitation for defendant with his
children, including weekly short telephone
visits at defendant's expense which required
plaintiff's keeping defendant apprised of her
phone number and residence. Contrary thereto
plaintiff and prior to the current disputes,
notified defendant that her address was P. 0.
Box 477, Brigham City, Utah 84302 and contact
would be made to make suitable visitation
modifications. Thereafter plaintiff notified
the clerk's office to forward child support to
Wendell Christensen, 519 Hawthorne Drive,
Brigham City, Utah 84302. That on August 8,
1984 the court entered its order requiring
plaintiff to provide an address where plaintiff
resided and could be served personally and where
defendant may visit the minor children of the
parties On September 17, 1985 (see Document No.
16868-83), pursuant to affidavit and motions,
the court ordered child support payments held by
the clerk until plaintiff provided the court and
the defendant the address and phone number of
the children. After some delay and receipt of
letters stating why the addresses and phone
numbers should not be given, plaintiff did
provide the court clerks such address and phone
number and the court directed the support
payments be forwarded to her.
(Record, pages 26-28; Addendum.)
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23.

Regarding the jurisdiction issue, Judge Call

documented his phone conversation with Commissioner Gaddis of
Washington State in the Statement and Order:
That pursuant to the plaintiff's earlier
motion made in the State of Washington for
transfer of jurisdiction to the State of
Washington and the request contained therein
that the Washington Court communicate with Judge
Omer J. Call, Box Elder County, Commissioner
Gaddis of the said Washington Court contacted
this court declining to accept jurisdiction,
noted the problems the minor children were
having because of the visitation fights, and
urged this court to retain jurisdiction for the
purpose of enforcing, adjusting or modifying
custody and visitation orders.
(Record, page 28; Addendum.)
24.

Judge Christoffersen denied Wendy Rawlings'

Motions to Dismiss Mark Weiner's Order to Show Cause, Motion
to Disqualify Judge Call, and Motion to Change Jurisdiction.
(Record, page 68.)
25.

On January 20, 1986, the Order Declining

Jurisdiction from Washington was filed.

The order, after

acknowledging a hearing in Washington on the issue of
jurisdiction and communication with Judge Call, stated:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED
that this court finds that the custody and
visitation of the children subject to this
proceeding has also been subject to the subject
matter jurisdiction of the Box Elder County
District Court of the State of Utah; that said
court acquired jurisdiction over the parties and
the subject matter several years ago and has
continuously exercised jurisdiction in
enforcement and modification proceedings; and
that one of the named parties, father of the
children, continues to reside in the State of
Utah; that upon communication with said court it
has elected and determined to continue
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exercising sole and exclusive child custody
jurisdiction; and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that pursuant to the
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (RCW
26:27) it is determined that Box Elder County
District Court of the State of Utah continues to
have exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over
the custody and visitation of the parties'
children, the parties not having agreed to
litigate exclusively in the State of Washington
and there being no emergency justifying
intervention in the matter by Washington Courts;
and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all Washington
proceedings concerning the custody of said
children are hereby stayed until further order
of the court or until an appropriate motion for
dismissal proceedings is filed and granted; and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the courts of
Washington and this proceeding shall remain open
for enforcement provisions of such orders as
have been and may be entered by the Box Elder
County District Court of the State of Utah
pursuant to the provisions of the UCCJA.
The order was signed on January 13, 1986.
72.

(Record, pages 70-

There is a copy of the Order Declining Custody in the

Addendum.)
26.

After discovery and various other motions, the

hearing on Mark Weiner's Order to Show Cause was heard by
Judge Call on May 21, 22 and 27, 1987.

The Clerk's Minute

Entry shows that Judge Call heard testimony from:

the

parties; Mark Rawlings; Mark Rawlings' former wife, Judy
Evans; Nels Sather of Bear River Mental Health; Dr. Thomas
Charles Fairbanks, a psychologist; Dr. Kim Openshaw, a
psychologist from Utah State University; Dr. Jack M. Reiter,
psychiatrist from the Seattle, Washington area; Dr. Elliott
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Landau, a psychologist from the University of Utah; and
Wendell and Rosalie Christensen, maternal grandparents of the
children and residents of Box Elder County.
interviewed the children in chambers.

Judge Call

Numerous exhibits were

presented and received by the trial court, including copies of
several psychologists' reports and court documents from
Washington State.
27.

(Record, pages 313-319; Exhibits #01-18.)

Wendy Rawlings filed an Order to Show Cause

against Mark Weiner on October 16, 1986.
28.

(Record, page 336.)

On October 21, 1986, the Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law and Order on Mark Weinerfs Order to Show
Cause were signed and entered by Judge Call.

(Record, pages

338-347.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

Having heard the original divorce of the parties

in 1982 and several orders to show cause prior to the Order to
Show Cause filed in October, 1985, which is the subject of
this appeal, the First District Court had continuing
jurisdiction of this case.
2.

Where Mark Weiner has never moved from the state

and the children continue to have significant contacts with
Utah and substantial evidence concerning their interests is
available in Utah, the requirements of Utah UCCJA and FPKPA
are fully satisfied.

Being fully satisfied, the First

District Court properly exercised its continuing jurisdiction
in this case.
-22-

3.

Whether or not to retain jurisdiction was in the

discretion of the First District Court.

There being no abuse

of that discretion, the First District Court should be
affirmed on this appeal.
ARGUMENT
Wendy Rawlings' cross-appeal in this case claims the
trial court had no jurisdiction to enter the October 21, 1986
Order on Order to Show Cause.

Wendy Rawlings did not appeal

the substance of the decision.
To argue the jurisdiction issue requires a step-by-step
analysis.

The analysis necessarily includes a discussion of

the trial court's basic jurisdictional authority in this case,
the effect of the Utah Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act
(hereinafter "Utah UCCJA") and the Federal Parental Kidnapping
Prevention Act (hereinafter "FPKPA") on the trial court's
authority, and the trial court's exercise of discretion
relative to jurisdiction in this case.

In short, did the

trial court have jurisdiction and was the trial court
authorized to exercise that jurisdiction.
I
THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF BOX ELDER COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH, HAD JURISDICTION TO SIGN AND
ENTER THE ORDER ON ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE IN THIS
CASE.
On September 27, 1982, the Amended Decree of Divorce
between Wendy Rawlings and Mark Weiner was filed.

The Amended

Decree provided that custody of the parties' five small
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children go to Wendy Rawlings, with carefully outlined
visitation to Mark Weiner.
Before and after the filing of the Amended Decree, Mark
Weiner has sought the aid of the court in compelling Wendy
Rawlings to honor the visitation order and allow the children
and their father their visitation time together.
Having heard and decided the divorce of the parties,
the First District Court has "continuing jurisdiction to make
such subsequent changes or new orders with respect to ... the
custody of the children and their support, maintenance, and
health and dental care ... as shall be reasonable and
necessary."

Section 30-3-5 Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended).

Numerous subsequent orders were made in this case by the trial
court, including the Order on Order to Show Cause entered
October 21, 1986, all of which were entered under the First
District Court's continuing jurisdiction.
II
THE TRIAL COURT'S EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION IN
THIS CASE IS CONSISTENT WITH THE UTAH UCCJA AND
FPKPA.
In October, 1985, the trial court signed an Order to
Show Cause pursuant to a Motion and Affidavit filed by Mark
Weiner.

The Order to Show Cause sought modification of the

Amended Decree and/or enforcement of the numerous previous
orders of the trial court relative to visitation, the proper
surname of the children, visitation expenses and so on.
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In November, 1985, Wendy Rawlings filed a motion in
Washington State seeking to have Mark Weiner's Order to Show
Cause heard in Washington.

Pursuant to Wendy Rawlings1

request, Washington Court Commissioner, Stephen M. Gaddis,
spoke on the phone with District Judge Omer J. Call.
Both Commissioner Gaddis in his Order Declining
Jurisdiction and Judge Call in his Statement and Order
acknowledge the continual exercise of jurisdiction in this
case by the First District Court beginning with the filing of
the divorce complaint filed by Wendy Rawlings in 1981.
(Record, pages 70-71 and 26-28 respectively.)

Commissioner

Gaddis' order acknowledges Mark Weiner's continued residence
in this state.

Judge Call's order points out Wendy Rawlings1

failure to keep Mark Weiner informed of the children's
whereabouts and phone number.

Both orders clearly confirm the

First District Court's continuing jurisdiction in this case
and the intent of both courts that the First District Court
has exclusive jurisdiction concerning custody and visitation.
Every procedure mandated and envisioned by the Utah
UCCJA was correctly followed in this case.
The first provisions of the Utah UCCJA which should be
considered in this case are Sections 78-45c-13 and 14.
Section 78-45c-13 requires the "recognition and enforcement of
foreign decrees."

Section 78-45c-14 sets out the

prerequisites for modification of a foreign decree.
Commissioner Gaddis correctly concluded in his order declining
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custody, pursuant to Section 78-45c-14(l)(a) "that the court
which rendered the decree (First District Court) does ... now
have jurisdiction under jurisdictional prerequisites
substantially in accordance with this act ... (and did not
decline) to assume jurisdiction to modify the decree ... ."
To determine what is meant by the first provision of
Section 78-45c-14(1)(a), it is necessary to review the
Commissioner's notes, other portions of UCCJA, and applicable
case law.

The Commissioner's note to Section 13 of the

Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (hereinafter the
"UCCJA") (virtually identical to Section 78-45c-13) states:
This section and sections 14 and 15 are the
key provisions which guarantee a great measure
of security and stability of environment to the
"interstate child" by discouraging relitigations
in other states. See Section 1 ... .
***

"Jurisdiction" or "jurisdictional
standards" under this section refers to the
requirements of section 3 in the case of initial
decrees and to the requirements of sections 3
and 14 in the case of modification decrees. The
section leaves open the possibility of
discretionary recognition of custody decrees of
other states beyond the enumerated situations of
mandatory acceptance.
***

9 U.Laws Annot. (1979 ed.) Section 13, page 151.
Section 1 of UCCJA (virtually identical to Section 7845c-l) states the general purposes of the UCCJA.

(Section 78-

45c-l is reproduced in the "statutes" section of this brief.)
The general purposes of the Utah UCCJA were met by the trial
court retaining jurisdiction in this case because
"jurisdictional competition and conflict" with Washington was
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avoided, cooperation with the Washington court was promoted,
litigation over custody and visitation took place in the state
where the children have significant contacts with their
father, maternal grandparents, numerous aunts and cousins, and
counselors and psychologists, continuing controversies
involving custody and visitation and continued attempts to
forum-shop and relitigate custody and visitation was
discouraged•
The "jurisdictional standards" referred to in the
Commissioner's notes on Section 13 are more fully discussed in
the Commissioner's note on Section 14:
Courts which render a custody decree
normally retain continuing jurisdiction to
modify the decree under local law. Courts in
other states have in the past often assumed
jurisdiction to modify the out-of-state decree
themselves without regard to the preexisting
jurisdiction of the other state. *** In order to
achieve greater stability of custody
arrangements and avoid forum shopping,
subsection (a) declares that other states will
defer to the continuing jurisdiction of the
court of another state as long as that state has
jurisdiction under the standards of this Act.
In other words, all petitions for modification
are to be addressed to the prior state if that
state has sufficient contact with the case to
satisfy section 3. The fact that the court had
previously considered the case may be one factor
favoring its continued jurisdiction. If,
however, all the persons involved have moved
away or the contact with the state has otherwise
become slight, modification jurisdiction would
shift elsewhere.
The First District Court has continuing jurisdiction
under Section 30-3-5.

The First District Court exercised that

jurisdiction nearly continuously since Wendy Rawlings filed
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the complaint in 1981. Though Wendy Rawlings moved with her
new husband and the children out of Box Elder County, Mark
Weiner still resides in Box Elder County, exercises much of
his rather extensive visitation in Box Elder County, the
maternal grandparents reside in Box Elder County, counselors
to the children and parties work and reside in Utah.

The

children's contacts with this state continues to be
significant, and were certainly so in 1985-86 at the time the
order to show cause was brought, heard, and decided.
The Commissioner's note refers to Section 3.

The

statutory cite in the Utah UCCJA is Section 78-45c-3. Section
78-45c-3(l)(b) provides that the court has jurisdiction in a
modification petition in child custody matters if it is in the
child's best interest by virtue of the child and one of the
contesting parties having "a significant connection with this
state" and "there is available in this state substantial
evidence concerning the child's present or future care,
protection, training, and personal relationships."

Section

78-45c-3(2) and (3) makes clear that physical presence of the
child is not the sole determining factor under Section 78-45c3(l)(b).
Section 78-45c-8 provides that a court may decline
jurisdiction if a petitioner does not have "clean hands."
Section 78-45c-8(2) provides:

"If the petitioner has violated

any other provision of a custody decree of another state the
court may decline to exercise its jurisdiction if this is just
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and proper under the circumstances."

There are several

expressions of concern by the trial court for the well being
of the children in light of Wendy Rawlings' conduct.
Specifically, the various orders on orders to show cause and
notations thereon, the Statement and Order, and the Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order on Order to Show
Cause appealed from to this Court.
The FPKPA (which is essentially the last word on full
faith and credit of custody orders in this country) requires
that full faith and credit be given to a custody order made by
a state which "has jurisdiction under the law of such state"
(28 U.S.C.S. Section 1738A(c)(1)), the state has continuing
jurisdiction (Section 1738A(E)) and the state "remains the
residence of the child or any contestant" (Section 1738A(d)).
Again, under Section 30-3-5, the First District Court
has continuing jurisdiction.
in this state.

Mark Weiner continues to reside

Where those two elements are present, under

FPKPA, Judge Call's Order on Order to Show Cause is entitled
to full faith and credit.
FPKPA goes even further than requiring full faith and
credit to a sister state's order.

FPKPA also restricts the

right of a sister state to modify the decree between the
parties in this case until Mark Weiner moves and the First
Judicial District otherwise loses jurisdiction of the case
through the loss of all significant contacts with the
children.
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There are several well-considered cases which support
the above analysis:
In State Ex Rel. Cooper v. Hamilton, 688 S.W.2d (Tenn.
1985), the parties were divorced in 1980 by an Indiana court.
The parties and the children had lived in Indiana many years.
The day after the divorce the mother moved to Tennessee.
Shortly after the divorce the father moved the Indiana court
for modification of the decree relative to custody of the
child in the mother's care.

The mother later moved the

Tennessee court for modification of the decree relative to the
visitation of the Indiana decree.

The Tennessee judge took

jurisdiction of both the father's and mother's petitions.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Tennessee held that
though Tennessee was the "home State" of the child under the
Tennessee version of UCCJA," the fact that a state is or has
become a 'home state' does not, in and of itself, give that
state authority to pre-empt the authority of other states."
688 S.W.2d at 824. Relying on Tennessee's equivalent to
Utah's Section 78-45c-14(1), the Commissioner's notes to
Section 14, quoted above, and Steele v. Steele, 250 Ga.101,
296 S.E.2d 570 (1982), the Court concluded:
There can be no question but that the intention
of the drafters of the Uniform Act was to give
priority to the original rendering state, and
not to other states, so long as at least one of
the contestants to the original action remained
in that state, and the state otherwise retained
j urisdiction.
688 S.W.2d at 825.
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The Supreme Court of Tennessee then quoted extensively
from a law review article by Brigitte M. Bodenheimer, the
Reporter who aided in the preparation of the Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction Act.

Bodenheimer "The Uniform Child

Custody Jurisdiction Act:

A Legislative Remedy for Children

Caught in the Conflict of Laws," 22 Vand.L.Rev. 1207 (1969).
Of particular interest is an example quoted from the article:
A typical example is the case of the couple who
are divorced in state A, their matrimonial home
state, and whose children are awarded to the
wife, subject to visitation rights of the
husband. Wife and children move to state B,
with or without permission of the court to
remove the children. State A has continuing
jurisdiction and the courts in state B may not
hear the wife's petition to make her the sole
custodian, eliminate visitation rights, or make
any other modification of the decree, even
though state B has in the meantime become the
'home state' under section 3. The jurisdiction
of state A continues and is exclusive as long as
the husband lives in state A unless he loses
contact with the children, for example, by not
using his visitation privileges for three years.
Bodenheimer, op.cit.supra at 1237.
688 S.W.2d at 826.
After citing the FPKPA, the Supreme Court of Tennessee
held in the case that until Indiana declined jurisdiction,
"primary jurisdiction to modify the Indiana decree remains
with the Indiana courts, not with the Tennessee courts, even
though this has become the 'home state' of the child whose
custody is involved."

Ibid.

In Kumar v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County, 32
Cal.3d 689, 186 Cal.Rptr. 772, 652 P.2d 1003 (1982), the
Supreme Court of California held that the California courts
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could not modify a New York decree unless New York declined to
exercise jurisdiction.

In that case, the parties were

divorced in New York in 1974.

The parties continued to live

in New York until 1979 when the mother, who had custody, moved
with the child to California.

In 1980, the father filed in

New York for modification of the decree.

Shortly thereafter,

the mother petitioned a California court for modification.
In a lengthy, scholarly, and very helpful opinion, the
California court cites sections from its version of UCCJA,
Commissioners Notes, also quoted at length herein, three of
Reporter Bodenheimerfs law review articles on UCCJA, including
the quote from the Vanderbilt Law Review, and FPKPA.
Acknowledging California to be the "home state," the
California court nevertheless ruled that the child and child's
father had significant contacts with New York and there was
substantial evidence concerning the child in New York.

In

support of its decision, the California court noted that:

The

child was born and lived in New York until moving to
California; the divorce and initial custody decree were
rendered by New York; the child had continued contact with his
father who continued to live in New York; "maternal
grandparents and other relations, neighbors and friends live
in New York;" and there was evidence the mother left with the
child for California without providing an address or phone
number to the father or making arrangements for visitation by
the father with the child.

652 P.2d at L004-5.
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The above facts are nearly identical to the facts in
this case.
The Supreme Court of California held that "...
California has no authority to modify the New York decree so
long as that state has jurisdiction and does not decline to
exercise it ... ."

The First District Court of Utah had

jurisdiction to enter the Order on Order to Show Cause and did
not relinquish its jurisdiction to do so.
In Cotter and Woods, 64 Or.App. 173, 666 P.2d 1382
(Or.App. 1983), the Oregon courts refused to modify a
California decree even though Oregon was the "home state."
Subsequent to the California divorce, the father filed for
modification of the decree in California and later obtained an
order of joint custody of the child with the physical custody
to the mother and specific visitation to the father.

The

mother moved to Oregon between the time the modification
petition was filed and decided.

Approximately 7 to 8 months

later, the mother petitioned an Oregon court to modify the
California decree.
The Court of Appeals of Oregon, citing Oregon's version
of UCCJA, ruled that though Oregon was the "home state,"
California still had jurisdiction where one of the contestants
was still living in California and there was a "'substantial
connection1 between the child, father and California."
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Again, Mark Weiner still resides in Utah and the
substantial connection between the children, Mark Weiner, and
Utah continues.
In yet another lengthy, scholarly, and helpful
decision, the Supreme Court of Connecticut upheld a decision
by the trial court to dismiss a petition for modification of a
Florida decree even though Connecticut was the "home state."
Brown v. Brown, 195 Conn. 98, 486 A.2d 1116 (Conn. 1986).
What is further interesting about the case is the petition for
modification was dismissed even though Florida's "Order
Relinquishing Jurisdiction" provided that Florida would
"resume jurisdiction over this dispute 'should the courts of
the State of Connecticut express their willingness that this
be done.'"

486 A.2d at 1125.

The requirements of UCCJA and FPKPA were met in this
case.

The First District Court had jurisdiction and properly

exercised its jurisdiction to hear and enter the Order on
Order to Show Cause.
Wendy Rawlings cites several cases in support of her
position that the First District Court had no jurisdiction or
at least should not have exercised its jurisdiction.

The

first case was Etter v. Etter, 45 Md.App. 395, 405 A.2d 760
(1979).

Etter, supra, involved parties who weren't even

divorced yet.

Initial custody orders and modifications of

existing custody orders require wholly different analyses
under UCCJA and FPKPA.

See generally Kumar v. Superior Court
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of Santa Clara County, supra, and analysis therein.

Since

this case involves a modification and in Etter, supra, there
was as yet no decree, Etter, supra/ is not relevant to this
case.
Green v. Green, 87 Mich.App. 706, 276 N.W.2d 472
(1978), favors Mark Weiner's position as the Michigan court
allowed jurisdiction only after the Texas court that issued
the original decree relinquished its jurisdiction in the case.
The First District Court never relinquished its jurisdiction
in this case.
Marriage of Settle, 276 Or. 759, 556 P.2d 962 (1976),
is distinguishable from this case as Oregon took jurisdiction
of a modification request only after it determined that
Indiana, the state that issued the divorce decree, had no
"significant connection" with the children or substantial
evidence" about the children.

Both are present in this case.

In addition, there is no mention of correspondence with the
Indiana court in Settle, supra.

The mother did not attend the

trial in Indiana as she had already moved to Oregon with the
children of whom she had an order of temporary custody.

The

Oregon court's finding that the Indiana decree was punitive,
the kids had never been in the custody of their father, and
there was no significant contacts or substantial evidence in
Indiana, formed the basis of Oregon's jurisdiction, none of
which is present in the case before this Court.
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In McCarron v. District Court in and for Jefferson
County, 671 P.2d 953 (Colo. 1983), both parties had left the
state where the original decree was rendered.
never moved.

Mark Weiner has

Though Commissioner's notes to Section 14 of the

UCCJA indicate when both parties move the state may lose
jurisdiction, that is not the case here. McCarron, supra, is
not relevant in this case.
As to McLane v. McLane, 570 P.2d 692 (Utah 1977), the
case is pre-Utah UCCJA and would necessitate an entirely
different analyses, if not result, if UCCJA was applicable.
The last case, Trent v. Trent, 735 P.2d 382 (Utah
1987), is discussed in Argument III below.
Ill
WHETHER OR NOT TO EXERCISE JURISDICTION UNDER
UTAH UCCJA IS DISCRETIONARY WITH THE FIRST
DISTRICT COURT.
In this case it is apparent that Judge Call and
Commissioner Gaddis determined that the First District Court
exercise its jurisdiction and hear and decide the several
matters raised by Mark Weinerfs Order to Show Cause of
October, 1985.

Judge Call's Statement and Order and

Commissioner Gaddis' Order Declining Jurisdiction appear in
the record and so state that the First District Court had
exclusive jurisdiction.

After receiving the go ahead from

Judge Christoffersen by virtue of Judge Christoffersen1s
memorandum decision of December 23, 1985, Judge Call went on
to exercise the jurisdiction of his court.
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In Trent v. Trent, 735 P.2d 382 (Utah 1987), the Fourth
District Court exercised its continuing jurisdiction to
enforce the visitation provisions of a divorce decree it had
issued some years prior.

Evidence was noted by the Utah

Supreme Court that the children had not lived in Utah since
before their mother was served with the divorce complaint.
Though the Supreme Court essentially ruled Utah UCCJA did not
apply to the case, the Court noted in reference to Section 7845e-7 that:

"Application of the foregoing factors to the

facts and circumstances of this case leads to the conclusion
that the court did not abuse its authority in declining to
relinquish jurisdiction."
The use of the words "abuse its authority11 suggests the
Utah Supreme Court allows the trial court to exercise the same
discretion in applying Utah UCCJA as is allowed in divorce and
modifications generally.

The standard of review of divorce

modifications is outlined in Harding v. Harding, 26 Utah 2d
277, 488 P.2d 308, 309 (1971):
This proceeding seeking to modify the divorce
decree is in equity; and it is the prerogative
of this court to review the evidence, to make
its own findings, and to substitute its judgment
for that of the trial court when the ends of
justice so require. However, due to the
prerogatives and advantaged position of the
trial court, we pursue that broad authorization
under certain rules of review which are now well
established: Its actions are indulged with a
presumption of validity and correctness and the
burden is upon the appellant to show a basis for
upsetting them: either (1) that findings have
been made when the evidence clearly
preponderates the other way, or (2) that there
has been a misunderstanding or misapplication of
-37-

the law resulting in substantial and prejudicial
error; or (3) that it appears plainly that there
has been such an abuse of discretion that an
inequity or injustice has resulted.
(Footnotes omitted.)
Citing Connecticut's equivalent provision to Utah's
Section 78-45c-7(l) and the word "may," the Supreme Court of
Connecticut ruled in Brown, supra;
Declining jurisdiction under Section 46b-97 is
discretionary with the court. By the inclusion
of the word "may" in that section, the
legislature clearly intended that the
inconvenient forum issue in UCCJA cases remain
discretionary; as is the common law forum non
conveniens principle. This discretion must be
exercised in accordance with the overall
purposes of the UCCJA; see General Statutes
Section 46b-91; which have been summarized by
some courts as consisting of the elimination of
"jurisdictional fishing with children as bait."
A determination by the court under Section 46b97 that Connecticut "is an inconvenient forum to
make a custody determination under the
circumstances of the case and that a court of
another state is a more appropriate forum";
General Statutes Section 46b-97(a); will not be
reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion.
This standard of review is necessary in order to
"discourage continuing controversies over child
custody in the interest of greater stability of
home environment and of secure family
relationships for the child."
486 S.2d at 1116 (a substantial number of case and statutory
citations are omitted).
The First District Court did not abuse its discretion
in retaining jurisdiction in this case.
As further suggested by Trent, supra, the burden was on
Wendy Rawlings to show that the parties' children would suffer
"prejudice or that the interests of the children would best be
-38-

served by relinquishing jurisdiction ... ."

735 P.2d 382.

There is no evidence before this Court that the parties'
children were in any way prejudiced or their interests
compromised by the First District Court's exercise of
jurisdiction in this case.

In fact, the record shows that

there were three full days of trial at which numerous
witnesses appeared, including Wendy Rawlings, her husband,
Wendy Rawlings1 parents, and Dr. Reiter, a psychiatrist from
the Seattle, Washington area.
Utah's and Washington's versions of the UCCJA call for
cooperation between the states in custody matters.

In Utah,

Sections 78-45c-16 through 22 (Washington's provisions are
essentially identical) provide for the ready exchange and
discovery of information in custody cases.
were certainly available to Wendy Rawlings.

Those provisions
The record

reflects the presenting of many Washington Court documents.
In her statement of facts, Wendy Rawlings refers to
continuing objections to jurisdiction made at the trial on May
21, 22 and 27, 1986.

There is no record of those objections

before this Court since no transcript was ordered by Wendy
Rawlings.

As held in Fackrell v. Fackrell, 60 Utah Adv. Rep.

39 (July 1, 1987), citing Sawyer v. Sawyer, 558 P.2d 607 (Utah
1976):
Appellate review of factual matters can be
meaningful, orderly, and intelligent only in
juxtaposition to a record by which lower courts'
rulings and decisions on disputes can be
measured. In this case without a transcript no
such record was available, and therefore no
-39-

measurement of the district court's action can
be made as urged upon us by defendant. Id. at
608-09.
Without "adequate citations to the record, the judgment of the
lower court is presumed to be correct."

Fackrell, supra, 60

Utah Adv.Rep. at 39.
The First District Court properly exercised its
jurisdiction in this case and its Order on Order to Show Cause
should be upheld.
CONCLUSION
The First District Court had continuing jurisdiction
and properly retained and exercised that jurisdiction in
issuing the Order on Order to Show Cause in this case on
October 21, 1986. This Court should so hold and affirm the
First District Court ruling in this case.
Dated this 21st day of October, 1987.
HILLYARD, ANDERSON & OLSEN

LARRY E. .J0NEIS
Attorney for Defendant and CrossRespondent Mark Douglas Weiner
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing BRIEF OF CROSS-RESPONDENT was mailed, postpaid, to
Stephen W. Jewell, Attorney for Plaintiff/Cross-Appellant, at
First Security Bank Building, 15 South Main, Logan, Utah
84321, this 21st day of October, 1987.

LARRY

E..Jj6tf&S/

Attorney for Defendant and CrossRespondent Mark Douglas Weiner
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

WENDY MARIE CHRISTENSEN
WEINER (RAWLINGS),
STATEMENT AND ORDER
Plaintiff,
vs.
Civil No. 16868
MARK DOUGLAS WEINER,
Defendant.

Hearing having been set for December 30, 1985, on defendant's
Order To Show Cause, plaintiff on December 18, 1985, filed Motions as
follows:
(a)

For change of jurisdiction to King County, State of

Washington;
(b)

For dismissal of defendant's order to show cause;

(c)

To continue the hearing on the matter for at least eight

to ten weeks;
(d)

For disqualification of Judge;

(e)

A motion for hearing on disqualification of Judge;

(f)

Motion for hearing on plaintiff's motion for continuance

and for dismissal of defendant's order to show cause.
With regards to motions for disqualification of Judge, the
court states:
(a)

That numerous documents appearing to be letters or statements
j

<

r*

f

of both parties, requests and reports have been presented i.to ,;th§ArJ?"7-.\. '
Judge's secretary and the clerks of court, all of which the Judge
MICRGriv.ED

'—^

-Al-

/

has declined to receive or review, but has ordered the same\held in
a separate file by the secretary;
(b)

The Judge has further refused to accept phone calls or other-

wise discuss or meet with the defendant;
(c)

That the Judge has advised the secretary and court clerks

that the defendant would have to comply with applicable procedures,
including notice to the opposing party in order to bring his requests
before the court.
After numerous hearings dating from the year 1981, the court has
entered a decree, amended decree, and several orders on orders to
show cause, the effect of which was to fix rights of visitation for
defendant with his children, including weekly short telephone visits
at defendant's expense which required plaintiff's keeping defendant
apprised of her phone number and residence.

Contrary thereto plaintiff

and prior to the current disputes, notified defendant that her address
was P. 0. Box 477, Brigham City, Utah 84302 and contact would be made
to make suitable visitation modifications.

Thereafter plaintiff

notified the clerk's office to forward child support to Wendell
Christensen, 519 Hawthorne Drive, Brigham City, Utah 84302.

That

on August 8, 1984 the court entered its order requiring plaintiff to
provide an address where plaintiff resided and could be served personall
and where defendant may visit the minor children of the parties.
September 17, 1985

On

(see Document No. 16868-83), pursuant to affidavit

and motions, the court ordered child support payments held by the

-A2-
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-3clerk until plaintiff provided the court and the defendant the
address and phone number of the children.

After some delay and

receipt of letters stating why the addresses and phone numbers
should not be given, plaintiff did provide the court clerks such
address and phone number and the court directed the support payments
be forwarded to her.
That pursuant to the plaintifffs earlier motion made in the
State of Washington for transfer of jurisdiction to the State of
Washington and the request contained therein that the Washington
Court communicate with Judge Omer J. Call, Box Elder County,
Commissioner Gaddis of the said Washington Court contacted this
court declining to accept jurisdiction, noted the problems the minor
children were having because of the visitation fights, and urged
this court to retain jurisdiction for the purpose of enforcing,
adjusting or modifying custody and visitation orders.
In view of the foregoing motions and pursuant to Rule 6 3 (b)
U.R.C.P. the court orders that copy of such motions and the file herein be certified to Judge VeNoy Christoffersen for determination of the
sufficiency of such motions.
Dated this

rO 3 <a day of December 1985.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

WENDY MARIE CHRISTENSEN
WEINER (RAWLINGS),
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Plaintiff,
vs.
Civil No.

16868

MARK DOUGLAS WEINER,
Defendant.

The plaintiff has filed a motion for change of jurisdiction
to King County in the State of Washington, which motion is denied,
Plaintifffs

since Washington has declined to take jurisdiction.

Motion for dismissal of defendant's Order To Show Cause will be
denied.

Request for continuance will be granted to the extent that

the December 30th, 1985 hearing will be vacated and set at the furtner
convenience of the court.

Plaintiff's motion for disqualification of

the Judge will be denied, the Judge indicating by his statement ana
order that he is not communicating with defendant and Judge Call is
qualified to hear any further action.
DATED:

/

2 3 December 19 85.
BY THE COURT: /

MAILING CERTIFICATE
Copy of the foregoing Memorandum Decision mailed this

<y rA day

of December 1985, to Stephen W. Jewell, Attorney "for Plaintiff, James
MICROFILMED

-

^ ^

-A4j

-2C. Jenkins & Associates, 67 East 100 North, P. 0. Box 3700, Logan
Utah 84321 and to Mark D. Weiner, Pro Se, 665 South 700 West,
Brigham City, Utah 84302.
Jay R. Hirschi
Box Elder County Clerk

By A faliUL ^ - Y/ : \ c/_
Deputy
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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON FOR KING COUNTY

6|
WENDY MARIE CHRISTENSEN RAWLINGS,

)

7;
Petitioner, )

81

91
101

NO. 85-3-04844-3
V.

ORDER DECLINING
JURISDICTION

MARK DOUGLAS WEINER,
Respondent. )

11

121
13

Petitioner's motion for determination of jurisdiction and

14

communication with Box Elder County District Court having duly

15

and regularly come on for hearing, the same being referred to

16

the undersigned commissioner who had presided over contemporane-

17

ous Juvenile Court proceedings concerning the custody of the

18

l

children subject of this proceeding and retained jurisdiction

19

therein; the court having further communicated with the appropri-

20!

ate judge of Box Elder County District Court; now therefore,

21

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that this court

221

finds that the custody and visitation of the children subject to

23

this proceeding has also been subject to the subject matter

24

jurisdiction of the Box Elder County District Court of the State

25

of Utah; that said court acquired jurisdiction over the parties

26!

and the subject matter several years ago and has continuously^

27

exercised jurisdiction in enforcement and modification proceed-

281

ings; and that one of the named parties, father ofAfc'tte'iofijLldren,
ORDER - 1
-A6-
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1

continues to reside in the State of Utah; that upon communica-

2

tion with said court it has elected and determined to continue

3

exercising sole and exclusive child custody jurisdiction; and

4
5

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that pursuant to the Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction Act (RCW 26.27) it is determined that Box

6| Elder County District Court of the State of Utah continues to
7

have exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over the custody and

8

visitation of the parties1 children, the parties not having

9

agreed to litigate exclusively in the State of Washington and

10

there being no emergency justifying intervention in the matter

11

by Washington Courts; and

12 I

I T IS FURTHER ORDERED that all Washington proceedings con-

13

cerning the custody of said children are hereby stayed

14

further order of the court or until an appropriate motion for

15

dismissal proceedings is filed and granted; and

16
1M

until

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the courts of Washington and this
proceeding shall remain open for enforcement provisions of such

18 I orders as have been and may be entered by the Box Elder County
19

District Court of the State of Utah pursuant to the provisions of

20

the UCCJA.

21

221
23

Dated and signed in open this / ~^ of January, 1986

24

Stephen Caddis

25

STEPHEN M. GADDIS, COURT COMMISSIONER

26
27
28

71
ORDER - 2

_A?_

Stephen 3ft. (Sabbts
COURT

COMMISSIONER

KING C O U N T Y SUPERIOR
SEATTLE

WASHINGTON

COURT
98104

January 13, 1985

Venoy Christofferson
District Court Judge
Box Elder County District Court
Box Elder County Courthouse
Brigham City, Utah 84302
Re: Rawlinqs v. Weiner
King County Cause No. 85-3-04844-3
Dear Judge Christofferson:
Pursuant to my communication with your court in December, 1985, I
have drafted and entered the original of the enclosed order. At
this time I do not know what further steps will be requested of
the Washington court, butj^ould appreciate your forwarding to the
clerk of our court copies further substantive orders or decrees
as may be entered in Utah respecting this family.
^SjLncerely, *
/)

*
Stephen M/T
. Gaddis

SMG/jl

t7

cc: Mark Weiner
Ralph Thompson, Jr,
Lynn Pollock

'••*
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

WENDY MARIE CHRISTENSEN
WEINER (RAWLINGS),
MEMORANDUM
Plaintiff,
vs.
Civil No. 16868
MARK DOUGLAS WEINER,
Defendant.

Plaintiff filed her motion to partially set aside a Memorandum
Decision dated December 23, 1985, by Judge Christoffersen, asserting
that such decision was erroneously based on the State of Washington's
having declined to take jurisdiction.
Since the motion and the memorandum in support thereof was
addressed to me notwithstanding the Memorandum Decision was made
by Judge Christoffersen, I conclude from the language of the rulings
of the Washington Court Judge that the Memorandum Decision of
December 23, 1985, was accurately based on the Washington Court's
conclusion that Utah was the proper forum.
Aside from those considerations the undersigned would not
consider it appropriate to attempt to modify Judge Christoffersen's

IkH?-/^
MICROFILMED

'

DotejVffffJteH No. D V

^

-A9-
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^'
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/
c / W

*'j£--

^

-2Memorandum Decision, and therefore plaintiff f s motion should be
denied.
/'-

Dated this

_day of February 1986,

BY THE COURT:

1' /
OMER J. ^CALL^DISTRICT JUDGE
I Concur In the Foregoing
Dated this

II!]_

I' f f
day of March, *9B6.tf
/ r /

A

I

rl
iLJ-

/
/

*—-

•'

!

Ve Noy^-Gh r i s t pf fpz& e n
District Judqe
/

MAILING CERTIFICATE
*******************

Copy of the foregoing Memorandum mailed this // - day o^
March, 1986, to Stephen W. Jewell, Attorney for Plaintiff, First
Security BanV Rider., Third Floor, '15 South Main, Logan, Utah
S4321
and to Mark Douglas Weiner, Pro Se, 665 South 700 West, Brigham
City, Utah
84302.

/? /<

>^

/<i

Patricia W. Parker

34
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I N THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF UTAH

I

TRIAL:

ORDERED ENTERED
CASE NUMBER
Judge
Court Reporter

21st

a n d 2 2 n d May

16868

Q VeNoy Chnstoffersen Ufomer J. Call
George Parker

t^KC&K#X

Wendy
Ma r

Court Clerk

198(

. Y

C.

Randall

Holmgren

This is the time set for bench trial in the above entitled matter
with plaintiff present represented by counsel, Stephen W. Jewell and
defendant present acting pro se.
Opening statements are made and Mr. Weiner presents his case.
Defense calls Mark B. Rawlings, present husband of* Wendy Rawlings,
who is sworn, examined, and cross-examined.
Defense calls Wendy Rawlings, plaintiff, as an adverse witness, who
is sworn, examined, and cross-examined.

The court recesses at 12:00 noon

with the children to be interviewed by Judge Call at 1:15 pm in chambers.
Court resumes at 2:05 pm after the interviews by Judge Call with the
children and the plaintiff returns to the witness stand and resumes
testimony.

The plaintiff is excused and defendant recalls Mark Rawlings

for testimony.

The witness is excused and defense calls, Judy Evans,

former wife of Mark Rawlings who is sworn, examined and cross-examined.
«

Objection is made by Mr. Jewell-to the testimony of Judy Evans and the
court overrules the objection.
Defendant is sworn and gives testimony to the court and Exhibits are
offered, marked and received as to both plaintiff and defendant as listed
on the attached Exhibit List.

The court recesses at 4:55 pm until 9:00

am on the 22nd day of May.

-AH-
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I N THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF UTAH
ORDERED ENTERED
CASE NUMBER

2 1 s t a n d 2 2 n d May
16868

191

•WENDY . MARIE. -CHRLSTENSEN • WEINER •
Plaintiff
vs.

f

Judge
Court Reporter

D V e N o y Christoffersen X O m e r J. Call
G e o r g e Parker
XK&K(X3£}£fX

Wendy
Court Clerk

MARK .DOUGLAS.WEINER

Randall

.Mary. .C.... H o l m g r e n .

Defendant

-2-

May 22, 1986, 9:00 am - Objections are made by Mr. Jewell to the
entering of any of the tapes offered by the defendant and the court
overrules the objection and will receive the tapes already submitted
for a limited purpose.

A standing objection is made by Mr. Jewell.

Defense counsel calls the following witnesses who are sworn, examined
and cross-examined:
Nels Sather, associated with Bear River Mental Health;
Thomas Charles Fairbanks, Dr. of Psychology;
Dr. Kim Openshaw, Utah State University Family Therapist;
Dr. Jack M. Reiter, Psychiatrist of the Seattle, Washington area.
The court recesses at 12:00 noon and resumes at 1:00 pm with plaintiff1
witness, Dr. Elliott Landau testifying before Dr. Reiter resumes the
witness stand.

Dr. Landau is qualified as an expert witness and is sworn

and gives testimony.

Witness is excused and Dr. Reiter resumes the

witness stand for cross-examination, and after witness is excused the
defense rests.
Plaintiff's counsel moves for a direct verdict which is denied pro
forma.

Plaintiff's counsel objects to this court's jurisdiction.

The

court recesses for a five minute break and resumes at 3:55 pm with the
plaintiff calling the following witnesses who are sworn, examined and
cross-examined:
Rosalie Christensen, mother of plaintiff;
-A12-
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF UTAH

I

ORDERED ENTERED 2 1 s t
CASE NUMBER
Judge

a n d 2 2 n d May

16868

D VeNoy Christoffersen iXOmer J Call

Court Reporter

George Parker

X^RXSOlSK

Wendy
Court clerk

1986

M a r y C.

Randall

Holmgren.

-3-

Wendell Christensen, Father of plaintiff;
Mark Rawlmgs, present husband of plaintiff.
The court recesses at 5:05 pm until 9:30 am Tuesday the 27th day of
May, 1986.
May 27, 1986 - Plaintiff's counsel calls defendant Mark Weiner for
testimony and submits letter by Mark Rawlings marked as Exhibit No. 16.
Counsel for plaintiff is sworn and gives testimony as to attorney's
fees expended by plaintiff.

Plaintiff's counsel recalls plaintiff and

when the witness is excused the plaintiff rests.
Closing arguments are made by both counsel and the court finds:
1.

Plaintiff is found to be in contempt of the court;

2.

Plaintiff does not indicate any willingness to obey court's
court
order and/refers to letter of October 3, 1983. As to the names of
the children used in record keeping or the names the children go by in
every day life, plaintiff shows no willingness to obey the court's
order in that respect.
3.

Plaintiff indicates no willingness to obey the court's order as

to the telephone calls and the receiving of mail as to the children.
The court grants:
n1 cr

1.

Each party joint custody of the children.

2.

School records and any other records are to be changed to the name
-A13-

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST J U D I C I A L DISTRICT
STATE OF UTAH
ORDERED ENTERED 2 1 s t a n d 2 2 n d May 1986
CASE NUMBER
16868

WENDY MARIE CHRISTENSEN WEINER
Plaintiff
vs.

(

Judge
Court Reporter

D V e N o y Christoffersen 2 O m e r J. Call
G e o r g e Parker
XXKKXKMK9CX

Wendy R a n d a l l
MARK

DOUGLAS

) Court c l e r k • - M a r » • c • • -Holmgren.

WEINER
Defendant

-4of Weiner and the children are to be made to understand that their name
is to be Weiner.
3.

Mental Health counseling is to be resumed for the children and

whoever does the said counseling is to be provided with Dr. Jack Reiter's
recommendations.
4.

Visitation for the summer is to begin with the defendant:
Either on,
Sunday, the 22nd day of June and run for six weeks;
Sunday, the 29th day of June and run for six weeks;
Sunday, the 6th day of July and run for six weeks;
Sunday, the 13th day of July and run for six weeks;

and on the condition that plaintiff is to notify defendant of which time
period is to be chosen by June 1, 1986, with defendant to be notified by
registered mail.

Plaintiff to have a weekly telephone call with all the

children and be allowed two weekend visitations from Friday to Sunday.
If defendant moves to the Seattle area then defendant to have four weeks
of summer visitation to be divided 2 weeks and a break and then another
2 weeks.
Thanksgiving and Christmas visitation is to be as heretofore specified
with children to be picked up at 3:00 pm Christmas Day and returned by
-A14-
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I N THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE.OF UTAH
ORDERED ENTERED 2 1 s t
CASE NUMBER
16868

a n d 2 2 n d May

198<

WENDY .MARIE CHRISTENSEN WEINER
Plaintiff
vs.

(

Judge
Court Reporter

D V e N o y ChristoffersenXS O m e r J. Call
G e o r g e Parker
XX&ttffieXMX

Wendy Randall
Court clerk . .Mary .G*. Holmgren.
•MARK- DOUGLAS- -WEINER

A'i"y'\
Defendant

-5-

3:00 pm the afternoon two days before the return to school.
If defendant makes visits to the Seattle Area he is to have six
weekend visitations or may have instead 3 to 4 days at the November
break of school and 4 to 5 days at the Easter break of school.
It will be the responsibility of Mark Weiner to pick up the children
and return for summer visitation; Mr. Weiner to be responsible for the
Easter; November visits and Christmas and may deduct $400.00 from support
money for the summer visitation period.

Plaintiff to pay $300.00 towards

three of the six visitations or may have $200.00 credit if children are
delivered to Utah.
Visitation for the 30th, 31st of May and June of this year is granted
by the court.
The Order that the Court signs will be enforced.
The court will require a current and regularly updated home phone
number and address to be furnished to each party and to the court where
the children can be reached by both parties.
The children of the parties are to be allowed to receive calls on a
weekly basis with the calls, not to be monitored by any party, and to be
for a reasonable time of 10 munutes and not to exceed 20 minutes with
each child.
Mail is to be picked up and received as to each child.
-A15-
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
STATE OF UTAH
ORDERED ENTERED
CASE NUMBER

21st

& 2 2 n d May

1986

.WENDY. .MARIE. .CHRISTENSEN WEINER
Plaintiff
Judge
[ Court Reporter

vs.

D VeNoy Chnstoffersen 2 Omer J. Call
George Parker
XteXXX&X^X

Wendy R a n d a l l
Court Clerk . .Mary. C.. .Holmgren.

MARK. .DOUGLAS . WEINER
Defendant

-6As to the money claims, each party will be required to pay his or
her own attorney's fees and other bills.
Defendant is to keep children on his insurance or if plaintiff desires
to then plaintiff will be required to furnish a letter to the court
stating her willingness to maintain the children on her insurance and
to pay all costs associated therewith and the children's name of Weiner
is to be retained on any insurance carried.
There is to be no guardian ad litem.
No law enforcement officers are to be brought to either home.
Division of Family Services may be used only to enforce compliance
of visitation.
In the absence of a Dr.'s Certificate all of the children are to
visit as to both parties.
As to all other issues the Order of December 14, 1984, will remain
in full force and effect.
Either party to prepare Order and submit to the opposing party before
submitting to the court for signature.
-A16a

Stephen W. Jewell 3814
Attorney for Plaintiff
First Security Bldg., Third Floor
15 South Main
Logan, Utah
84321
Telephone:
(801) 753-2000
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF BOX ELDER COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

WENDY MARIE CHRISTENSEN
RAWLINGS,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No- 16868

MARK DOUGLAS WEINER,
Defendant.

The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing
on May 21, 22, and 26, 1986, the Honorable Omer J. Call
presiding.

The Plaintiff appeared personally and by and

through her attorney, Stephen W. Jewell.
appeared personally.

The Defendant

Sworn testimony and evidence was

presented to the Court.

The Court having heard the testimony

and having reviewed the pleadings on file herein and the
Exhibits presented, including the information from the
Washington Shelter Care proceedings, and having heard the
arguments of Plaintiff's counsel and Defendant, and good cause
appearing therefore, now makes the following:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

That Plaintiff has continued to use the name of

Rawlings as the name for the children.

RAWLINGS FINDINGS & CONCLUSION
-A17-
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2.

That the reports offered by the expert witnesses

'feg^sd^^iw^t l>ai*Jbaur„»nd Dr. Jack Reiter, are accepted by the
Court and shall be provided to current mental health care
providers.
3.

It is m

the best interest of the children to

terminate all litigation m
4.

It is m

this matter.

the best interest of the children for all

parties to receive counselling, while recognizing that the
best therapy is termination of all conflict.
5.

It is m

the best interest of the children to

receive regular mail and regular telephone contact with their
father.
6.

It is m

the best interest of the children that

phone calls not be monitored by either party, except as to
time limitation, and that any other recording, video taping or
like method be discontinued.
7.

It is m

the best interest of the children that

there be no change m

actual physical custody of the children

but that legal custody should be vested jointly m

Plaintiff

and Defendant.
8.

It is m

the best interest of the children to revise

the visitation schedule and method of establishing the
visitation schedule.
9.

For the emotional health and well-being of the

children all conflicts between the litigants must be
terminated.

2
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10.

It is in the best interest of the children that the

orders of this Court be enforced, but that no party or other
individual or entity exert undue influence, force or control.
11.

It is not necessary to appoint a Guardian Ad Litem,

but one may be appointed if requested by the parties.
12.

It is in the best interest of the children that no

police officers or other individuals intervene in visitation
except as to compel reasonable compliance with the orders of
this Court.
13.

None of the claims of either of the parties for

medical bills or attorney's fees shall be allowed; and each
party shall bear his or her expenses.
14.

There is insufficient evidence of a substantial

change in circumstances to warrant any chahge in child support
paid by Defendant.
15.

Defendant is obligated to provide medical insurance

for the children but said insurance and all medical expenses
can be provided by the Plaintiff at her own expense if she so
desires, and after notice to Defendant.
16.

Transportation expenses for visitation should be

modified.
17.

All other orders and provisions of the Court shall

remain in full force and effect.
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WHEREFORE, the Court having heretofore entered its
Findings and Facts, now enters its

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Plaintiff should be held in contempt of Court for

failing to obey the order of this Court to discontinue the use
of the Rawlings name as the name for the children.

(c

2.

The reports offered by

expert witnessaf^zfirr

SU^H-m*'\~_l,rmJ^iL-A^ Dr. Jack Rieter shall be used by the Court
and current family therapy providers.
3.

Jurisidiction lies with this Court to hear this

action.
4.

There haveyisubstantial changes in circumstances

since the Decree of Divorce was entered and since the previous
order of the Court was entered, which substantial changes
necessitate a modification of the Divorce Decree pursuant to
the Findings of Fact asistated above.

''rd^^

IIS jo^DATED this
^ „' _ day of ^5?77 1986.

BY THE COURT:

Confirmed copies mailed this
date to Stephen W. Jewell and
Mark D. Weiner by:

Mary q/mHolmgren^/

Tmer J . C a l
D i s t r i c t Jiidge

Deputy
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Stephen W. Jewell 3814
Attorney for Plaintiff
First Security Bldg., Third Floor
15 South M a m
Logan, Utah
84321
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF BOX ELDER COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

WENDY MARIE CHRISTENSEN
RAWLINGS,

ORDER ON ORDER TO
SHOW CAUSE

Plaintiff,
CiVil No. 16868

vs.
MARK DOUGLAS WEINER,
Defendant.

The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing
on May 21, 22, and 26, 1986, the Honorable Omer J. Call
presiding.

The Plaintiff appeared personally and by and

through her attorney, Stephen W. Jewell.
appeared personally.

The Defendant

The Court having heard sworn testimony

and evidence and having reviewed the pleadings on file herein
and the Exhibits presented, including the information from the
Washington Shelter Care proceedings, and having heard the
arguments of Plaintiff's counsel and Defendant, and having
heretofore entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law,

and good cause appearing therefore, now enters the

following:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
W

'CROFI

/^?~

L W E D

.»-*.*RAWLINGS

OTSC
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1.

Plaintiff shall be and is hereby held m

contempt of

Court for failing to comply with the previous order of the
Court to discontinue the use of the R a w l m g s name for the
children.
2.

The name of the children is Werner and there shall

be no use by the Plaintiff of the R a w l m g s ' name as the last
name of the children, either for scjhool records, medical „ ,J ;
records,

3.

or o t h e r w i s e . , j^^UtL^\

yy^^t^udf

+e ^<f<^t

rU

,w->~*

„C> JL*^*^

The reports of E t o ^ S : g ^ : = : ^ ^ H ^ t f ^ Dr. Jack

Qz3^

Reiter shall be presented to all current mental health care
providers for their review and consideration.
4.

Counseling and therapy as ordered by this Court and

by the Washington Court shall be resumed with Dr. Marilyn
Eshelman or such other qualified mental health care provider
as determined by Plaintiff and therapy shall be continued with
Dr. Tom Fairbank for Defendant.

The Court specifically orders

that once said mental health care provider is selected by
Plaintiff, there shall be no change of therapists without an
order of the Court.

Therapy will continue until terminated by

the Court on the recommendation of the therapists.

Should the

therapist become unavailable or desire to terminate the
relationship, Plaintiff shall immediately thereafter petition
the Court for removal thereof and appointment of another
mental health therapist.
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5.

All mail sent by Defendant or Plaintiff to the

children shall be received by Plaintiff or Defendant and
delivered/rto the children, whether said mail is sent first
class or registered.
6.

Each party shall provide the other party and the

Court with a current and regularly updated home phone number
and address*

During visitation, Defendant shall reasonably

inform Plaintiff of the whereabouts of the children and shall
provide an address and telephone number where the children can
be reached.
7.

There shall be no monitoring of telephone calls or

other recording of conversations or video t a p i n g ^ <- '
8.

It is the order of the Court that telephone

conversations need be no longer than ten (10) to twenty (20)
^

minutes long.
9.

Legal custody of the minor children of the parties

shall be jointly vested m

each of the parties, with Plaintiff

being granted primary physical custody of the children with
visitation to Defendant as herein provided.
10.

Defendant shall be granted visitation with the

children as follows, recognizing that visitation is for the
chidren, and their needs are of primary importance

m

determining visitation arrangements:

A.

During the children's school summer vacation,
Defendant shall be entitled to six (6) continuous

-A2 3-

7«J 4

,

.„

weeks.
For 1986 said visitation shall b e g i n , o n
June 2 2 for^ six (6) weeks,/ on June 29 for six
(6) w e e k s , on July 6 for six (6) w e e k s , or on
July 13 for six (6) weeks at the d i s c r e t i o n of
Plaintiff.
P l a i n t i f f shall notify the D e f e n d a n t
June 1, 1986, by registered mail, when said
v i s i t a t i o n shall begin, and on each year
t h e r e a f t e r on or b e f o r e June 1.
Said
v i s i t a t i o n to be scheduled m
future years
shall s u b s t a n t i a l l y comply with the order
as as stated above.
S a i d ^ s i x J 6) w e e k s
v i s i t a t i o n shall begin Is&dztizF? Jat 5:00 p.m.,
and c o n t i n u e for six (6) w e e k s to the sixth
S s p S & y at 5:00 p.m.
During said six (6) week v i s i t a t i o n , P l a i n t i f f
shall be granted at least weekly t e l e p h o n e
c o n v e r s a t i o n s with each of the c h i l d r e n and
shall be allowed v i s i t a t i o n for at least two
(2) w e e k e n d s , b e g i n n i n g Friday at 5:00 p.m.,
to Sunday at 5:00 p.m.
P l a i n t i f f s h a l l notify
D e f e n d a n t of the v i s i t a t i o n s c h e d u l e on or
n
b e f o r e June 1, 1986, and s u b s e q u e n t y e a r s , by
r e g i s t e r e d mail.
Said v i s i t a t i o n may be
KJ
exercised by P l a i n t i f f ojg^fcsgx^^p^i e •» L-ti, JtfCf&li u X J
and JQrwjadjljag==f^^
and the c h i l d r e n
shall be picked up and returned to Pr:l']gJwm ~lu/ 2^^**
<gg£&f~ with no other r e s t r i c t i o n s e x c e p t as
'
stated herein.
D e f e n d a n t shall be allowed f u r t h e r v i s i t a t i o n
of four to five (4 to 5 ) d a y s during the
c h i l d r e n ' s school E a s t e r v a c a t i o n m
the
spring and three to four (3 to 4) d a y s during
O c t o b e r or November as is allowed by the
c h i l d r e n ' s school v a c a t i o n as scheduled, not
to i n c l u d e T h a n k s g i v i n g .
P l a i n t i f f shall notify
D e f e n d a n t of the d a t e s and t i m e s such v i s i t a t i o n
shall take place by r e g i s t e r e d mail at least
sixty (60) d a y s prior to said v i s i t a t i o n , or
when the school s c h e d u l e is a v a i l a b l e .
Said
v i s i t a t i o n shall m
no way i n t e r f e r e with
regularly scheduled school.
T h a n k s g i v i n g and C h r i s t m a s v i s i t a t i o n shall
c o n t i n u e as provided in p r e v i o u s o r d e r s of the
Court.
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11.

Travel expenses for all visitation, including

picking up the children m

Washington and returning them to

Washington for the summer visitation, shall be the
responsibility of Defendant.

Defendant shall be entitled to

deduct from child support payments a total of $300.00 per year
for all visitation and travel expenses.

If Plaintiff delivers

the children to Brigham City and picks up the children from
Brigham City for any visitation, Defendant shall be entitled
to deduct only $200.00 for total travel expenses rather than
$300.00.

Defendant shall continue to be allowed to reduce

child support obligations by $400.00 during summer visitation.
12.

There shall be no other changes in child support

paid by Defendant except as ordered for travel expenses.
13.

All repeated conflict and emotional distress and

strain shall be discontinued by the parties.
14.

No police officers or other individuals shall

intervene or otherwise be used to force compliance with this
order.

Washington Social Services or such other qualified

agency shall be allowed to assist m

compelling compliance of

the Court order if deemed reasonably necessary by such agency
after a proper review.

The Court will allow reasonable

exclusions from visitation for illness if any such child is
isolated because of said illness or upon a doctor's
certification.

5
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15.

Defendant shall continue to be responsible for and

maintain health insurance coverage for the children.

If

Plaintiff desires to obtain medical insurance and provide
insurance and health care coverage, Plaintiff is allowed to
provide the same at her own expense.

If Plaintiff so elects,

she shall inform the Defendant thereof in writing and
Defendant shall thereafter be relieved of further duty and
obligation to provide health insurance or medical coverage.
16.

Neither of the parties shall be allowed to recover

for costs and expenses m

this action, whether travel,

medical, legal or otherwise, and each party shall bear his or
her own costs and expenses incurred m

this action and prior

hereto.
17.

All other requests and motions of Defendant except

as herein specifically provided shall be and are hereby
denied.
20.

All other orders of the Court as previously entered

and not modified by this order shall stand as otherwise
provided.

y
DATED this

""day of _

BY THE COURT

Confirmed copies mailed this date
to Stephen W. Jewell and Mark
D. Werner by:

rn^j

<£. 7 ^ - ^ ^ A

Mary^/C.

Holmgren-peputy
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Omer J. Cal
District Judge
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